Abstract: This paper reports results o f research on the so-called "guns/butter" question. Using multiple re gression techniques, we estimate the relationship between military and social spending for the United States (1 9 2 9 -7 2 ), France (1 9 2 0 -1 9 7 3 ), West Germany (1 9 5 0 -1 9 6 9 ), and the United Kingdom (1 9 2 0 -1 9 7 6 ). Reasoning from theories of budgeting, the controllability o f social expenditures, and the effects o f economic conditions on government resource allocation, we argue that "guns/butter tradeoffs" are unlikely to appear in short-term expendi ture changes. The results generally confirm this hypothesis: only for the United States does a negative association appear between the two types o f expenditure. For the other three countries, economic factors seem to be the driv ing force in social expenditure change.
Introduction
After a period of relative quiet, events have re turned the issue of defense spending to the arena of popular and scholarly debate. For sup porters and clients of social programs, increas ing international tensions and the accompany ing commitment to higher defense spending raise the prospect of cuts in social programs. External requirements, they fear, may force a "guns/butter" tradeoff to the detriment of the poor, the retired, and other beneficiaries of social policies.
As briefly reviewed below, this "guns/butter" question has been the topic of considerable re search by political scientists, sociologists, and economists. In 1974, the present authors began building on existing research within the context of a broader research project on the role of the military in advanced, industrial democracies (see Kelleher 1978) . Support was originally pro vided by the Center for West European Studies, University of Michigan; at present the project is directed by the senior author at the Center for Political Studies, also at Michigan.
Much of our effort has gone toward the collec tion of comparable time series on two types of variables: expenditures and policy outputs (doctors, teachers, military force structures). The (maximum) time coverage is the period ; at present, we have fairly solid series for the United States, France, the United * We are grateful to Miroslav Nincic, our collaborator in the larger project from which this report is drawn; and to Jens Alber, whose suggestions considerably improved the present discussion.
Kingdom, and Germany. Less complete data exist for Sweden, Japan, Italy, and the Nether lands.
In this article we report preliminary results of our analysis of the relationship between defense and social spending. The analysis, which was presented in more extended form at the Uppsala meetings of the International Sociological As sociation, is based on four countries: the United Kingdom , France (1920 France ( -1974 , the United States , and the Federal Republic of Germany (1950 Germany ( -1969 . The longer version of the paper, as well as additional infor mation on our larger project, can be obtained from the senior author. Needless to say, we would also be grateful for the comments and cri ticisms of scholars engaged in similar research.
Previous Research: Summary
Previous research on the guns/butter question has focused on three possible manifestations of tradeoff relationships: relationships among trends in the share of national resources allo cated to defense and social programs; relation ships among short-term (yearly) fluctuations in these variables; and on evidence that decision makers explicitly "trade-off5 the two types of expenditure during budgetary deliberations. The results of these three types of research can be summarized as follows:
Trends in defense and social expenditures are negatively related, especially in wartime and in the period since the Second World War. More over, the direction of trends suggests that social expenditures have gained from the declining share of resources allocated to defense. Scholars have interpreted these findings as evidence that social expenditures have become the "hard prio rities" of politics in the advanced, industrial democracies (Russett 1971; Sprout/Sprout 1968; Morse 1975 ).
Short-term relationships have been less frequent ly studied, and the number of significant rela tionships is fewer than is the case in studies of trends. The results indicate that short-term trade offs occur, if at all, only in states with relatively large defense budgets, and that those which do occur are confined to the controllable side of state expenditures, i.e., to those not channelled through trust funds or semi-autonomous agen cies, such as the French Caisses or the German Kassen (Pryor 1968; Caputo 1975 ).
Tradeoffs in decision-making appear to be al most nonexistent. Due to fragmented participa tion in budgeting, time constraints, and the difficulty of operationalizing social goals, de fense and social expenditures are rarely compar ed directly in the budgetary process and are even less frequently "traded o f f ' (Crecine 1976; Heclo/Wildavsky 1974) .
Previous Research: Evaluation
In attempting to extend existing research, we have addressed ourselves to what we see as three weaknesses. First, we pose the basic theoretical question: why should defense and social expend itures be negatively related? From the results of trend studies, we know that social expenditures have gained while defense has declined, and stu dies of yearly changes reveal little negative effect of defense on social expenditures. Although some scholars have pondered the theoretical reasons for this divergence of empirical result and popu lar controversy, most reasoning has been an ex post reaction to null findings. We have therefore attempted to develop a theoretical framework for relating defense and social expenditures, based largely on the question of controllability, styles of budgeting, and the economic environ ment of spending. Although we cannot review that framework here, we can summarize our major hypothesis: due to the political and ad ministrative noncontrollability of social expend itures, and due to the lack of coherent "trade o ff' mechanisms in governmental budgeting, it is unlikely that yearly changes in defense spend ing will be related to changes in social spending.
Our analysis thus addresses what we see as a second weakness in previous research: the neg lect of short-term relationships. This seems especially important for purposes of informing the policy debate mentioned in the Introduction. Clients and policy-makers, we would argue, are more interested in change from existing levels than in the levels of expenditure themselves.
The third weakness in previous research has been the lack of statistical controls in analysing social expenditure. Although there is a con siderable literature on the economic, social, and political determinants of these expenditures (Alber 1979) , these are rarely taken into ac count in defense/welfare studies. We hope to correct this weakness by introducing control variables into our analyses.
To summarize, the analyses presented below attempt to answer two questions:
1. Are short-term changes in defense spending related to changes in social spending?
2. Do such relationships hold in the presence of controls for third variables?
Our analyses are based on yearly changes in de fense and total social spending, in constant cur rency units. The next two sections of this re search note contain our results, first in a graphic summary, then in the form of regression esti mates predicting the yearly change in social ex penditure. Independence of social and defense expenditure (US 1929 (US -1968 UK 1920 UK -1947 France 1920 France -1939 . In these cases, the two types of ex penditure seem to move in response to different stimuli: defense apparently in response to war or international tension, with social expenditures barely fluctuating at all. This pattern points to a generally low priority for social expenditureperhaps understandable for these earlier periods -and to a "boom or bust" quality in defense budgeting. In any case, there is little indication of a direct tradeoff between the two types of spending. 
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Symmetry in expenditure change (UK 1948 (UK -1976 France 1967 France -1973 F.R.G. 1950 -1963 . In these cases peaks and troughs of our two categories occur simultaneously, suggesting that both are determined by similar stimuli. In the French and British cases, economic difficulties present a plausible explanation for these simutaneous movements. As in the previous case, there is no indication of direct tradeoffs. Rath er, the pattern suggests a positive relationship, other things being equal.
The above two "ideal" patterns leave only three potential cases of "tradeoff': the United States (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) , France (1947 France ( -1967 , and West Germany (since 1963). In these latter cases, peaks and troughs also occur simultaneously, but in opposite directions, providing the only indication that defense and social expenditure may be in competition for resources.
These "ideal" patterns hide considerable com plexity, however, as can be seen by examining each of the national contexts. The graph for the United States shows some of the idiosyn cratic aspects of American expenditure experi ence. Defense changes clearly show the "boom or bust" quality mentioned above, even during the tensions of the Cold War period. The peaks in defense change all correspond to periods of intense mobilization for combat -World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. A "peace dividend" does lead to positive social expenditure change after wars, but increases are hardly proportion ate to the previous shift toward defense. Thus our categorization of the United States as largely a case of "independent" expenditure movements.
British expenditure before 1948 suggest differ ent determinants for defense and social expend iture, with perhaps a few periods of marginal tradeoff -such as the dip in social service ex penditure as war approached in 1939. The out standing characteristic of this period, however, is the flat trend in defense changes except in time of war, dramatic evidence of the British tradition of mobilization and procurement only when war has begun or appears virtually cer tain within months. In short, social expend itures actually appear to be the driving force in this period, unaffected for the most part by defense, which apparently was dependent on external change for dramatic additions to the budget. In sum, our graphic analyses suggest some an swers to the first question posed above: defense and social expenditures do at some times and in some countries show a relationship. However, this relationship is not always negative. Rather, a positive association appears equally frequent, suggesting a joint dependence on similar deter minants. We hypothesize that economic fluctua tions and the flow of revenues may be the key variables in this relationship. In the regression analyses to follow, we test this possibility, and extend the analysis further by adding potential ly important political determinants of social spending.
Regression Results
As noted in the Introduction, one of our re search goals has been to correct a weakness found in previous studies: the lack of controls for third variables. In this section, we present regression estimates of the effect of defense ex penditure on social expenditure, with controls for a number of factors which appear potential ly important either on theoretical grounds or on the basis of existing social policy research.
Here we can provide only a brief explanation of our reasons for including specific variables in our equations.
The analyses described on the following pages include the following variables (in addition to the yearly change in defense expenditure):
Available Resources: This variable is perhaps the most-discussed in the social policy litera ture, and judging from the results of research in that field, it represents a plausible compet itor to defense in explaining fluctuations in social spending. Further, we have seen in our graphic analyses that economic conditions may influence the relationship between defense and social expenditure. We operationalize available resources as the yearly change in constantprice national product (GNP).
Revenues: Although revenue flows are probably correlated with change in available national re sources, such revenue elasticities presumably vary across time and country. We might expect revenue flows to lessen the effect of defense expenditures when their elasticity is high, thus avoiding the necessity of hard choice within a slowly growing economic "pie" . We operation alize this variable as government revenues in percent of national product (REVENUE as % GNP).
Unemployment is included in our estimations as a "problem pressure" variable; we expect social expenditures to rise when economic conditions produce the need for unemployment benefits and countercyclical expenditures. This variable is operationalized as the percent of the labor force unemployed (UNEMP. %).
War Involvment, as we have seen, produces both the largest increase in defense and the most noticeable decrease or stagnation in social ex penditures. To isolate these war-related effects from normal peacetime budgetary behavior, we have constructed a "dummy" or binary variable for those years in which our four countries were at war (1 = War year; O = Peacetime).
Government Intervention:
We hypothesize that, the greater the degree of government involve ment in the economy (and society), the greater is the expectation, and perhaps the need, for continued or increased intervention. As suggest ed by the label in the Tables (EXPEND as %  GNP) , this variable is operationalized as govern ment expenditures in percent of GNP.
Government Ideology has become a prominent variable in the policy studies literature. After initially contradictory results, most recent re search has concluded that socialist (or labor) governments do increase government expend itures disproportionately. Our equations there fore include variables to separate partisan in fluences. In the United States, we have two "party in power" variables (REPUBLICAN PRE SIDENT, REPUBLICAN CONGRESS), and for the United Kingdom, we have coded the party in control of Parliament (CONSERVATIVE PM). Of course, for West Germany our dummy varia ble could be coded only for the year of SPD rule covered by our data (SPD GOVERNMENT). For France, we coded socialist rule for the peri ods 1924-1927, 1936-1937, and 1946-1947. In addition, we created a dummy variable for the years of De Gaulle's presidency to examine the effects of the well-known policy of inde pendence.
The equations were estimated using either or dinary least-squares techniques or, in the pre- sence of heteroscedascity, using generalized least squares (estimation procedures are des cribed more fully in the longer version of the paper cited in the Introduction). All coeffi cients reported below are unstandardized.
Our results are reported in Tables 1 and 2 , which provide the regression coefficients (betas), t-statistics, and significance levels, and in Table  3 , which summarizes the results by comparing the partial correlation coefficients from each multiple regression.
The tables contain few dramatic results, but there are a number of interesting findings which, which did not include the dummy variable for the Wilson years, GNP did prove to be the strongest variable in the equation. The latter were years of general economic instability and employment crises. Taking this latter result together with the overall strength of the GNP variable in our four countries, the general con clusion is that economic factors -GNP, un employment, revenues -are far stronger than defense spending in accounting for changes in social spending.
Turning to some specific relationships which appear in the results, we see that, in contrast to the equations for France and West Germany, unemployment does affect social spending change in the United Kingdom and the United States. On reflection, this does not seem sur prising, given the comparatively higher levels of unemployment in the latter two countries. In addition, this result points to the multidimen sionality of "economic variables" ; in two of our countries (USA and UK), economic difficulties appear to be major influences on social spend ing change, while in France and West Germany it may be that economic growth allowed social expenditures to expand.
Only in the United States is there indication of a direct tradeoff between defense and social spending: a significant, negative relationship be tween the two variables. How one interprets this finding has crucial implications for the re search question posed here: do U.S. politicians, in contrast to their European counterparts, al locate resources such that increases in one type of expenditure must be paid for by a decrease in others? Such a result would be significant, since American political institutions are usually characterized as more fragmented than the European, with choices often blurred by the separation of powers and the independence of the bureaucracy in policy-making processes.
Counterintuitive or not, a tradeoff does appear to be present, especially in light of two other variables which are significant in the equation: revenue (negative) and unemployment (positive). These relationships suggest that government social spending has been greatest in times of economic downturn. Higher rates of unemploy ment have lead both to more individual pay ments and to public-service programs to ease the effects of economic dislocation. Further, since economic slowdown produces less revenue and creates pressure for tax cuts, reduction in defense spending would seem a logical source of flexibility in budgeting.
Finally, we should note that economic down turns in the United States have usually coincid ed with the termination of wars. The late fort ies, fifties, and early seventies were all periods of reduced economic growth after demobiliza tion from war.
It is interesting to note that only in the United Kingdom does war involvement come close to a significant negative effect on social spending. British mobilization strategy was clearly more extensive and more dependent on the capture of all available resources than that of the United States. This remains true even though we have controlled for the longer period of British war involvement and for the lower absolute level of GNP.
The least successful of equations is for interwar France. Even our economic indicators -so far the most powerful in all of our analyses -per form weakly, and this in a period of extreme economic difficulty. It may be that the variables we have employed are simply too generally de fined to deal with the critical influences of a period of extreme political and economic insta bility. More critically, it may also be that our data for France require re-examination, since this country poses the most difficult problems in constructing a complete social expenditure variable. If we have underestimated the social category for France, this could be the source of the weak results in the interwar period.
In summarizing the results of our regression ana lyses, we return to the "ideal" patterns discuss ed in the graphic presentation. We categorized France (1947 -1967 ) and the Federal Republic (1950 -1961 as "symmetric", i.e., defense and social spending moved in the same direction, possibly due to their dependence on similar in fluences. The regression results confirm this reasoning: defense is positively related to social spending in these two countries, with the latter determined primarily by changes in GNP. We suspect that defense spending would also be strongly related to GNP in these countries, al though we
have not yet performed the neces sary analyses.
Our third "symmetrical" case, the United King dom , also shows a positive re lationship between defense and social spending, but the correlation of social spending with un employment suggests that economic difficulties underlie movements in the two categories. As in the case of France and West Germany, speci fication of these interrelationships awaits the analysis of defense spending as a dependent variable.
The U.S. case, although unique among our four countries, may well be the most relevant for the future; here a tradeoff occurred, under con ditions of declining military outlays, slowing of economic growth, and increasing social ex penditures. If we compare this "constellation" to the conditions currently prevailing in the in dustrial democracies (increasing defense, econo mic slowdown, and high expectations for con tinued social spending), it would appear that the circumstances for difficult "guns/butter" choices may indeed have arrived. But this must remain speculation for the present. In order to improve our ability to specify the conditions under which such hard choices will arise, we have outlined a program of continuing research. We plan both improvements and extensions, as described in the closing section.
Future Plans
One of the challenging aspects of reporting pre liminary research results is the opportunity to expose future plans to the comments and criti cisms of others. In this section we briefly list those steps (most already underway) which we feel will most improve our understanding of the relationship between defense and social priorities.
Most urgent is the need to develop a more satis factory data base. In the best of all possible worlds, definitions and categories of policy ac tivity, revenue collection, national accounts, and economic indicators would be constant across national boundaries. Unfortunately, this is rare ly the case. In our data, for example, revisions of expenditure definitions for the United King dom required an undesirable division of the time-series; data for the post-World War II peri od have also been changed in successive retro spectives. As noted above, the French data may also be underestimated.
We are encouraged by the promised availability of several new data collections in the near future (particularly those of Peter Flora and Jürgen Kohl at Cologne, and those of the Ameri can National Bureau of Economic Research). However, as others have discovered, public ex penditure series can at best serve as indicators, not as absolutely verifiable values for discrete policies. Thus, in connection with data limita tions, we think some thought should be given to conducting intensive case analysis of budge tary processes, specific decisions, or specific periods (such as economic or international cri ses). In this way, we may be able to link our quantitative models to the more perceptual milieu of the resource allocation process.
Even within the more quantitative mode of investigation, additional work will have to be devoted to improving the statistical models used in estimating expenditure change. The use of a single equation, as we have done here, obviously involves a simplification of the pro cess which generates increases and decreases in public expenditures. More realistic would be a system of equations which specify at least some of the more prominent of the in teractions and joint determinants of the rele vant variables. Of course, improvement of stati stical models could in many cases be aided by close attention to other research methods, such as the case studies mentioned above.
Unquestionably, we must also begin to look more specifically at social expenditures them selves. Instead of the aggregate social expend iture variable examined here, each of the com ponent social programs could be studiedhealth, education, social assistance, or even sub sidies to individuals or groups. It is obvious, of course, that trends and change in these sub categories are not determined by the same po litical, economic, and social factors. However, the theoretical work required to specify those determinants, and the implications for the re lation with defense spending, should not be un derestimated.
Research on social policy suggests that attention to demographic change should be increased. De tailed analysis of school-age populations, size of the labor force, and change in the old-age population would be relevant explanatory varia bles for the detailed analyses suggested here.
Our treatment of revenues also deserves addi tional attention. Because public expenditures are funded from a variety of revenue types (i.e., direct/indirect; payroll tax/general revenue), which are levied on different categories of in come earner (households, corporations), changes in different revenues may vary in their impact on the expenditures under investigation. In short, the question of who pays for what is highly relevant.
Our treatment of "political variables" requires th ' e most additional work. The mere inclusion of a handful of "dummy" variables does little to il luminate the specific workings of the political ideology of governments or the array of interest groups and populations which maintain them in office. Yet the difficulty in conceptualizing, let alone operationalizing, these aspects of institu tions, individuals, and groups accounts in part for their absence here. Nonetheless, additional work in this area WÜ1 probably produce fruits of far greater value than extended search for better expenditure data. And as is the case in specifying theoretical relationships, a variety of research methods will probably be required to illuminate the workings of these "political" fac tors.
Finally, it is clear that the present model per forms well only in the sense of producing a high value in terms of "variance explained". The true test of such techniques, however, lies in their ability to inform forecasts of future trends. We have made one hesitant step in this direction above, but we would be remiss to place too much faith in such first-cut analy sis. Nonetheless, when political controversy suggests that a "guns/butter" dilemma is of concern to mass and elites alike, such empirical evidence can inform the discussion by provid ing estimates of the likely incidence and timing of societal "tradeoffs".
